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McKay: Labor Law--Successorship--the NLRB Has a Change of Heart
STUDENT NOTES

LABOR LAWSUCCESSORSHIP-THE NLRB HAS A CHANGE OF HEART
THE WILEY DOCTRINE
In John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,' the United States Supreme
Court handed down a landmark decision. Wiley held a successor
employer had a duty to arbitrate under the arbitration provisions
of a predecessor employer's labor contract, although the successor
had neither been a party to nor assumed the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court apparently based its opinion on broad national
labor policy considerations. More particularly, the Court stressed
the influential role of arbitration on national labor policy, acknowledging that arbitration has functioned as a "substitute for industrial
strife," and was "part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process itself."2 Moreover, the Court emphasized that:
It would derogate from "the federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration" . . . if a change in the corporate
structure or ownership of a business enterprise had the
automatic consequence of removing a duty to arbitrate
previously established; this is so much as in cases like the
present, where the contracting employer disappears into
another by merger, as in those in which one owner replaces another but the business entity remains the same.3
Finally, it stressed that:
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their
businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be
balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the "employment relationship. The transition
from one corporate organization to another will in most
cases be eased and industrial strife avoided if employees'
claims continue to be resolved by arbitration rather than
by "the relative strength ... of the contending forces" . ..
'376 U.S. 543 (1964).

2Id. at 549 quoting from United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-

tion Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
3Id. at 549 (emphasis added) quoting from United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
4Id. at 549 (emphasis added) quoting from United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
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The introduction of the Wiley doctrine produced controversy
among labor law scholars. Accordingly, the flow of scholarly opinion
on the multi-faceted topic of "successorship" has been prolific.'
Recently the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has reconsidered the Wiley case and modified the law significantly. Before
elaborating on these recent decisions, perhaps it may be informative
to look in retrospect at certain post-Wiley cases and from these
attempt to trace the lines of thought that may have played a role
in prompting the Board to redirect the law of successorship.
The Court in Wiley seemed deliberate in confining its ruling
to the narrow inquiry of whether a duty to arbitratewhich had been
established previously under a predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement would survive a change in ownership. Thus, the decision
assured that subsequent to such a change, employees would be
afforded relief from abrupt shifts in the industrial environment.
However, some commentators voiced a fear that arbitration in
itself might not adequately safeguard employee rights.
THE WACKENHUT INTERPRETATION

Shortly after the Wiley decision, the question of successorship
was presented squarely to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers,6 the facts indi-

5 See, e.g., CCH Analysis: Successors: With the Business Goes the Labor
Contract,4 CCH LAB. L. REP. fT8083; Bernsteen, Labor Problems on Acquisitions and Sale of Assets, N.Y.U. 22ND. CONF. ON LABOR 81 (1969); Goldberg,
The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L REv. 735
(1969); Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers,
Collective Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C. L. Rv. 413 (1966); Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business, 19
CCH LAB. L. J. 160 (1968); Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate; A Reconsiderationof John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 418 (1968); Note, The Duties of Successor Employers under John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston and its Progeny, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498 (1968);
Note, The Successor Employer and his Duty to Arbitrate under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement of the Predecessor: The Progeny of John Wiley and
Sons v. Livingston, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 273 (1967); Note, The Contractual
Obligations of a Successor Employer under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of a Predecessor, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 914 (1965); Comment, Successor
Employer's Obligation to Remedy Unfair Labor Practices, 68 COLUM. L. Rav.
1602 (1968); Comment, Labor Obligations of Successor Employers, 36
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 215 (1967); Comment, Labor Law Contract SurvivalSurviving Corporation May Not Hold Union to Predecessor Employer's Contract, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 220 (1969); Comment, Successor Corporation Subject to Labor Arbitration Agreement of Merged Corporation, 17 SYR. L.
REv. 513 (1966); Comment, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston-Survival of
Arbitration Rights and Procedural Arbitrability, 60 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 224
(1965); 66 COLUM. L. REv. 967 (1966); 5 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 182 (1965);
16 SYR. L. REv. 164 (1964); 41 TEMP. L. Q. 156 (1967); 13 VILL. L. Rav.
232 (1967).
6 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
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cated Wackenhut had entered into an agreement to purchase
substantially all of the assets of General Plant Production Company
(a limited partnership engaged in providing guard service for California Oil and chemical plants). Under the contract of purchase
and sale, Wackenhut expressly assumed the bulk of General Plant's
monetary liabilities. However, Wackenhut was careful to avoid
express assumption of any existing labor agreements-one such
agreement being with the United Plant Guard Workers of America.
Upon consummation of the sale, General Plant served notice on the
respective unions that all employees would be dismissed, but assured
them that all accrued wages and benefits would be paid. Later,
Wackenhut posted a notice inviting these employees to re-apply for
their former positions. The union unsuccessfully demanded that
Wackenhut recognize the existing collective bargaining agreement.
At the time General Plant discontinued guard service, Wackenhut began to render the identical service using the same office
facilities and equipment, employing most of the personnel who had
previously worked for General Plant. Under instructions from the
union, these employees failed to follow the re-employment procedures outlined by Wackenhut. The union then brought suit against
Wackenhut under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.7 At the trial, the union urged the following three theories:
(1) Wackenhut had expressly agreed to be bound by General
Plant's labor agreement; (2) Wackenhut was estopped from denying the effect of the labor agreement; and (3) "Wackenhut as the
successor employer is, . . . apart from the subsequent agreement or

principles of estoppel, bound by the labor agreement of its predecessor .

.

. ." In ruling for the union, the trial court accepted

the first theory but refrained from commenting on the remaining
two. On appeal the circuit court said the lower court erred only in
theory selection; the third theory was the most appropriate. The
court decided "the policy of the national labor laws obligated
Wackenhut, the successor employer, to honor the collective bargaining agreement contracted by its predecessor ...

."'

Then, perhaps an-

ticipating confusion as to the grounds for the relief granted, the court
further elaborated:
729

U.S.C. § 185 (1964).

8 Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 955
(9th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 958 (emphasis added).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

The specific rule which we derive from Wiley is that
where there is substantial similarity of operation and
continuity of identity of the business enterprise before and
after a change in ownership, a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration provision, enteied into by
the predecessor employer is binding upon the successor
employer.
It follows that under the rule of Wiley, Wackenhut is
bound by the collective bergaining agreement . . . and

is bound thereunderto arbitratethe union grievances...."
The salient feature of Wackenhut was the court's reading
Wiley to require the successor employer to honor in toto the
collective bargaining agreement and not merely its arbitration provision. This plainly was an expansion of the successorship doctrine
in that the Supreme Court apparently had not chosen to resolve
that issue.
RELIANcE-A SHORT STEP BACK

It was not long before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was
presented with a similar successorship problem in the case of United
Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc." There, Martin Marietta
Corporation was ordered by the Federal Trade Commission to divest
itself of a concrete pipe plant. The Commission's order directed the
divestiture allow the plant to function as a "going concern." Pursuant
to this mandate, the plant was sold to Reliance Universal. However,
the contract of sale contained a provision stating that the "Buyer
shall not assume any obligation of the . . . [seller] under any collective bargaining agreement ..
."" The United Steelworkers of

America had been denominated the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers prior to the sale and had negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement, which was fully operative at the time of the
change in ownership. Reliance continued to operate the plant as a
"going concern" without significant change in the operating, supervisory, or managerial personnel. Under these circumstances, the
union demanded that Reliance adhere to the existing labor contract.
Reliance refused and the union brought suit to subject the employer
IOld. (emphasis added).
11335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
12 Id. at 893.
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to this contract. In addition, an order directing arbitration was
sought. The district court dismissed the complaint and the union
appealed. In granting the dismissal in the company's behalf, the
district court emphasized that:
to impose the old owner's labor contract upon the new
owner would be "such a complete innovation that it cannot
be regarded as a feature of federal common law under 29
U.S.C. 185 [section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act], but must await adoption through the legislative
sanction of Congress". 3
Notably, Wiley had not been decided at the time the district court
rendered its opinion. 4 On appeal, however, the circuit court's
examination of the case in light of Wiley altered its result. Judge
Hastie, in reversing the lower court, was quick to point out that he
was unwilling to follow the view espoused in Wackenhut. He
determined that the Supreme Court had not held the entire collective
bargaining agreement unqualifiedly binding upon a successor employer. Moreover, he noted "the Supreme Court seem[ed] to have
been careful to avoid so broad a ruling." 5 Nevertheless, the Reliance
court apparently sought middle group between the two cases, concluding:
[The] collective bargaining agreement, as an embodiment
of the law of the shop, remained the basic charter of labor
relationsat the Bridgeville plant after the change in ownership. But, in the arbitration of any grievance asserted
thereunder, the arbitrator may properly give weight to any
change of circumstances created by the transfer of ownership which may make adherence to any term or terms of
that agreement inequitable.1
Apparently, the Reliance court was not ready to affirm the
liberal interpretation of the Wiley rationale adopted by the ninth
circuit. Instead, Reliance adhered to a more literal or restrictive
17
construction of the successorship principle.
13
14

Id. (emphasis added).

Less than two weeks later the Supreme Court announced the Wiley
decision.
15 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895
(3d. Cir.
1964).
16
1d. (emphasis added).
17 The court stressed that Wiley had implicitly recognized that:
New circumstances created by the acquisition of a business by a
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A similar question was presented in McGuire v. Humble Oil
& Refining Co.'" The pertinent aspect of the case was the complaint
drawn against Humble Oil, the alleged successor. It requested not
only an order directing the defendant honor the arbitration provisions
of various collective bargaining agreements but further demanded
that Humble "be restrained from pursuing any activities contrary
to the provisions of the respective agreements; in effect, a request for
specific performance of the collective bargaining agreement provisions."' 9 The court experienced little difficulty in finding that
Humble should be compelled to arbitrate. On the question of total
contract survival the court aligned substantially with Reliance in
denying the "other relief" sought by the unions. Again, the court
demonstrated unwillingness to expand the Wiley principle beyond the
Reliance interpretation. Indeed, it said that it was clearly within the
arbitrator's power to determine which rights survived the change
in ownership. The court intimated the arbitrator and not the court
was best suited to fashion a remedy.
Tim BoAR--AN EVASIVE POLICY
Shortly after Wiley, the NLRB General Counsel served notice
that "in the interest of consistent interpretation and development of
collective bargaining concepts under federal labor law:"" 0 he
new owner may make it unreasonable or inequitable to require labor
or management to adhere to particularterms of a collective bargaining agreement previously negotiated by a different party in different
circumstances. Although the pre-existing labor contract indicates the
structure of labor relations and the established practice of the shop
at the beginning of the new proprietorship, an arbitrator of a subsequent complaint charging unwarranted departure from that scheme
may properly consider any relevant new circumstances arising out of
the change of ownership, as well as the provisions of and practices
under the old contract, in achieving a just and equitable settlement of
the grievance at hand. The requirements of the contract remain basic
guides to the law of the shop, but the arbitrator may find the
equities inherent in changed circumstances require an award in a
particularcontroversy at variance with some term or terms of that
contract. We do not imply that any departure from what was
established under the old contract is justified by any special circumstance of this case. We do not know. And, in any event, this
is a matter for the arbitrator'sdetermination.
335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1964) (emphasis added).
18247 F. Supp. 113 (S.D. N.Y. 1965), rev'd 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966). The case was somewhat novel in
that it involved two competing unions, a fact which subsequently led to its
reversal;
but on different grounds than those discussed in this note.
' 9 McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 247 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965).
20 NLRB General Counsel's Quarterly Report on Case-Handling Developments, 58 L.R.R.M. 54, 58 (Dec. 31, 1965).
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would authorize the issuance of section 8(a) (5)21 complaints in
certain successorship cases. He emphasized those complaints would
not only allege a duty of the successor employer to assume the
predecessor's bargaining obligations, but also a duty "to honor those
terms of any existing contract between the predecessor and the union
which were not 'unreasonable or inequitable' under the circumstances."2 2 Notwithstanding this positive assertion, for quite some
time the Board seemed reluctant to face the issue of total contract
survival squarely. During this time, it appeared that the Board
uniformly approached the issue with an attitude which could be
characterized as "obviously evasive".
In pre-Wiley decisions the Board ordinarily adhered to the
general rule that the obligations of the predecessor employer's collective bargaining agreement would not descend to the successor
so long as he had in no way contractually assumed the agreement.2"
Subsequent to Wiley, the Board was confronted with a steady stream
of successorship cases analogous to those which had perplexed the
federal circuits. For example, in Valleydale Packers, Inc., 4 a Virginia corporation acquired the office plant and place of business of
a Miami company. At the time of the acquisition there was an
operative collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the new
plant superintendent announced to the union that all employees
would loose their seniority and be regarded as new employees without paid vacations or wage increases until the firm realized an
increase in profits. The union wrote the employer directing his attention to the outstanding collective bargaining agreement. The
employer responded by refusing to comply with the provisions of
the labor contract and even declined to recognize the union as bargaining agent. The Trial Examiner concluded the employer had
committed an 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice in unilaterally changing
the terms and conditions of employment and by unlawfully refusing
to bargain. Although the union's complaint included an allegation
2129 U.S.C. § 158 (1964):

(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159 (a)
of
this title.
22
NLRB General Counsel's Quarterly Report on Case-Handling Developments, 58 L.R.R.M. 54, 58 (Dec. 31, 1965) (emphasis added).
23 Rohlik, Inc., 145 NLRB No. 120, 1964 CCH NLRB Dec. ff12,873.
24 162 NLRB No. 139, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. g 21,091.
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that the employer's refusal to give effect to the predecessor's labor
contract was in itself an 8(a)(5) violation, the Trial Examiner
refused to pass on this issue, deferring its resolution to the Board.
In adopting the findings of the Trial Examiner, the Board skirted
the question of contract survival by asserting "no useful purpose
would be served in determining the (successor's) liabilities, if any,
under its predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement ...
""
The Board took a similar route in Glenn Goulding.2 6 There,
the predecessor employer signed an agreement with the Retail Clerks
Union requiring the employer's adoption of the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the union and the Food Employers'
Council. Following the execution of this agreement Joseph Glenn
Goulding succeeded the employer as the franchisee of Fed-Mart
Corporation. He occupied the same premises, continued to maintain the store's various departments without substantial change, and
generally employed all the people who had worked for the predecessor.
Despite repeated requests, Goulding refused to recognize and
bargain with the incumbent union. Consequently, 8(a) (5) and
8(a)(1)7 charges were filed. The Trial Examiner sustained the
position of the union, ruling that Goulding was obligated to bargain
since the union represented a majority of the employees. The Examiner further concluded that since Goulding was a successor, "his
statutory duty to recognize and bargain with [the union] encompasse[d] a duty to honor his predecessor's collective-bargaining contract."2 However, the Board on review again adhered to the evasive
25 Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 NLRB No. 139, at 1486 n.l., 1967 CCH
NLRB Dec. ff 21,091, n.l. The Board supported its elusive position by alluding
to the fact that the present collective bargaining agreement was due to expire
in less than one month and pointing to its existing affirmative order for the
successor to commence bargaining with the union.
26 165 NLRB No. 22, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec.
21,454.
27 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964):
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
28 Glenn Goulding, 165 NLRB No. 22, at 215, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec.
V 21,4541, at 27,968. In so stating, the Trial examiner adopted the view
taken by General Counsel that John Wiley and Sons v. Livingston compelled
the Board to revise its current standards regarding the scope of a successor
firm's bargaining duty. The Trial Examiner concurred and submitted that:
Since the Supreme Court's decision, two circuit courts of
appeals [sic] [Wackenhut and Reliance] have, indeed, construed
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston as holding that firms properly subject
to characterization as successors remain bound to honor their predecessors' entire collective bargainingcontracts, whenever the circum-

i"
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policy established in Valleydale Packers. In short, the Board ruled it
was "unwilling on the instant record to hold that the successor employer's statutory bargaining obligation extend[ed] beyond the fundamental duty to recognize and bargain in good faith with the labor
organization that had been designated by the predecessor's employees. ' 9
Still again, in Thomas Cadillac, Inc.," the Trial Examiner
found the successor's refusal to give effect to its predecessor's union
contract was in violation of section 8(a) (5). This ruling was
"wholly in harmony with the Supreme Court's teaching in the
Wiley case.""1 Nevertheless, the Board was able to avoid discussion
on that point because it discovered the examiner had been incorrect
in his determination that the employer was a successor under the

circumstances presented.32
It seems apparent from these NLRB rulings and the federal
circuit court decisions that the issue of total contract survival had
stances of their succession reflect "substantial continuity of identity
and operation" with respect to the business enterprises concerned,
before and after such a change.
165 NLRB No. 22, at 216 (emphasis added). Furthermore, General Counsel
cogently suggested in his brief:
[Ilf the stability of labor relations requires a continuity of bargaining
rights, then the same policy considerations dictate a continuity of
contract rights. There is no logical reason why a successor employer
should be bound by one and not the other. If employees lost the
rights secured for them in labor contracts every time a business
changes hands, the prior negotiations would prove to be of minimal
value. New negotiations would mean a gap in the terms and conditions of employment. Employees would be subjected to an uncertain
fate which, of course, does not mean stability of labor relations.
165 NLRB No. 22, at 217 (emphasis added).
The two cases, examined in conjunction with Counsel's thesis, pursuaded
the Examiner that the successor was bound by the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement.
29 Glenn Goulding, 165 NLRB No. 22, at 202, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec.
21,4541, at 27,968. The Board rationalized its hesitation to follow the lead
of the Trial Examiner by stressing that the record was replete with uncertainties. Also, the Board voiced suspicion as to whether the previous
employer had executed the contracts in question through arm's length
bargaining.
30 170 NLRB No. 92, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ir 22,306.
a, Comment, Labor Obligations of Successor Employer, 36 Gno. WASH.
L. Ruv.
215, 222 (1967), (Footnote omitted).
32
See also K. B. & J. Young's Super Markets, Inc., 157 NLRB No. 17,
1966 CCII NLRB Dec. ff 20,220, enforced, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1967). The
Trial Examiner had found that a successor's refusal to honor the predecessor's
labor contract was an unfair labor practice. However, his recommended
order had not included a positive directive that the successor administer the
provisions of the contract. General Counsel excepted to his failure to do so.

ir

Once again the Board adroitly noted it was unnecessary to pass on the issue

since the union had already given notice of its desire to reopen contract
negotiations and had not lodged objection to the Examiner's omission.
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aroused disagreement in the federal courts and was handled gingerly
by the NLRB. There was scarcely more agreement among the commentators. One writer optimistically stated that the Wackenhut
rule of total contract survival was appropriate if the Board's successorship criteria were met and the bargaining unit remained the same
after the change in ownership.33 Another took a contrary position
and alleged the Trial Examiner's findings in the Glenn Goulding and
Thomas Cadillac cases had been improper extensions of Wiley.
Each case, he submitted, had expressly adopted the Wackenhut
view, an unwarranted interpretation of Wiley.34 A third writer
contended the desire for short-term industrial stability alone would
support automatic contract survival." Yet, he conceded that in
Wiley the Court's concern was limited to the duty to arbitrate. He
then stated that so long as the "Court regards arbitration as an
informal, inexpensive, expeditious forum and the arbitrator as the
adjudicator more likely to comprehend the parties' relative interests,
long-term industrial stability can best
be achieved by initial judicial
36
abstention on the merits of survival.
HACKNEY IRON AND STEEL-A PRELUDE TO A CHANGE IN POLICY

Amid the steadily increasing speculation and discussion of contract survival, the NLRB again confronted this bothersome question
in Hackney Iron & Steel Co.3" The Trial Examiner decided the facts
warranted a conclusion that Hackney Iron and Steel, as a successor
employer, was guility of various unfair labor practices. However,
33 Note, The Duties of Successor Employers under John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston and its Progeney, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 498 (1968). This theory
of total contract survival, he reasoned, was in accord with the Wiley policy
of employee
protection.
34
Comment, Labor Obligations of Successor Employers, 36 GEo. WASH.
L. Rnv. 215 (1967). He retreated somewhat, however, by conceding that
although the Trial Examiner had improperly analyzed the legal precedents,
national labor law policy would have lent support to the conclusions reached.
3-Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Transfers,
Collective
Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C. L. REv. 413 (1966).
3
6Id. at 430.
37 167 NLRB No. 84, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. f 21,791. The predecessor employer, Tru-Weld, had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in
1965. In 1966, Trinity Industries, which owned Hackney Iron and Steel,
purchased the assets and equipment of Tru-Weld at its Navasota plant in
Texas and promptly leased the premises. Hackney Iron and Steel hired all
the former production employees, who continued in substantially the same
type of work and job classifications they had held under Tru-Weld. When
former Tru-Weld employees applied for work, the new employer asserted
that he would not recognize the union contract but would talk to the employees on an individual basis. It was also made known that the employees
would be hired without continuance of their seniority rights and at new
)rates of pay.
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the Examiner seemingly borrowed some of the phraseology used in
Reliance and boldly stated that as
to the labor contract signed by the predecessor and the
union it: "remained as the basic charter of labor relations at the plant after the change of ownership, which as
a matter of national labor policy must survive any general
or specific exclusion of its terms and obligations from the
transfer of assets, so that (the successor) is bound to
recognize and carry on all its terms, so long as the Union
remains the statutory bargaining agent of the employees." 38
The Board, however, once more subjected the Trial Examiner's
theory to the same evasive technique previously employed. In short,
the Board conveniently found it unnecessary to confront the issue
since that determination was found not to be within the scope of the
complaint. But on petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia39 doubted the soundness of the Board's persistent practice of evading the contract survival question. The court
expressed some disagreement with the Board, saying:
"[w]e. .do not understand quite why the Board
believed that it was relieved of the burden of considering
the matter. .... We do not say that there is no rationale
by which the Board's order of relief in this successor
employer situation may not in appropriate circumstances
differentiate between ordering recognition of a certified
union and bargaining with it for a new contract, on the one
hand, and recognition which includes observance of an
existing contract, on the other. But, especially in the light
of [Wiley], this matter needs more illumination than the
Board has provided in order for us meaningfully to review
the disposition it has made of the matter here."4
Therefore, the case was remanded for further considerationthere appeared to be no alternative for the Board but to confront
the problem. Accordingly, the remand was combined with three
other cases pending on Trial Examiner's reports; the four cases
raised an issue of substantial importance in the administration of
38
Hackney Iron & Steel Co., 167 NLRB No. 84, at 28,547, 1968-1 CCH
NLRB
Dec. f"21,791.
3
409 Chemical Workers Union v. NLRB, 395 F.24 6j39 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id. at 641 (emphasis added),
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the National Labor Relations Act. An offer was extended to
interested parties to file briefs amici curiae and to participate in the
oral argument.' Of the four cases, the Board focused on Burns
Int'l Detective Agency. 42 There the facts indicated that Wackenhut,
the predecessor employer, had been engaged in performing plant
protection services for Lockheed Aircraft Service Company. The
United Plant Guard Workers of America had been certified as the
bargaining representative for the full-time and regular part-time plant
protection personnel. Apparently Wackenhut had an agreement with
Lockheed which called for the termination of the former's services
on a particular date. Pursuant to that agreement Lockheed let the
service contracts out for bids. At a prebid conference attended by
Burns, Lockheed served notice that the Wackenhut guards were
represented by the union. When Burns was advised it had been
awarded the contract it immediately began interviewing several of
the Wackenhut guards for employment. Bums assisted the American
Federation of Guards in soliciting certain employees. Thereafter,
Burns extended recognition to the American Federation of Guards
and disregarded the assertion of the incumbent union that it was the
proper bargaining representative. Included in the union's claim
was a demand that Burns honor the bargaining agreement with
Wackenhut. Bums resisted and the union filed unfair labor practice
charges. The Board, on review of the case, evidenced a profound
change of heart. Not only was Burns in violation of sections
8(a) (2)" 3 and 8(a)(1) of the Act by assisting and recognizing the
American Federation of Guards but also it had committed section
8(a)(5) and 8(a) (1) violations in refusing to abide by the contract
between Wackenhut and the union.
This was indeed a bold step, and the Board meticulously outlined the policy considerations justifying its departure from past
practice. At the outset, the Board made it clear that:
41 The following parties filed briefs amici curiae: The Chamber of Commerce of the United States; American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers; The International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America; and the National Federation of Independent Unions.
42 182 NLRB No. 50, 1970 CCII NLRB Dec. gI21,863.
43 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964):
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-

(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support

to it ....
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The concept of substantial continuity in the employing industry enunciated as a necessary condition for the
survival of the duty to arbitrate when the ownership of a
business changes hands is at the heart of [a] determination
that a purchasing employer is a successor employer within
the meaning of the act."
Then its opinion indicated that a demonstration that the "employing"
industry had remained essentially the same despite a change in
ownership was a prerequisite to a finding of successorship.
The Board re-emphasized that it had always been understood
in labor quarters that industrial peace could best be achieved if
the "employing" industry was subject to the remedial provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act. Furthermore, it felt that certain
broad policy considerations weighed heavily in favor of "the maintenance and adherence to existing collective-bargaining agreements.... ."I' The Board therefore concluded that absent "unusual
circumstances" an employer found to be a successor would thereafter be compelled to honor his predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement. Based on the foregoing findings, the Board easily
7
disposed of Travelodge Corp."' and Hackney Iron and Steel,1
companion cases to Burns. Travelodge was not a successor because
the requisite degree of continuity of ownership was lacking, whereas
Hackney Iron and Steel seemed to fall comfortably within the successorship criteria established in Burns.
The Bums decision made clear to all prospective purchasers
the duty to continue the collective bargaining agreement intact
would, in most cases, attach to a successor. Remaining unanswered
was the converse-should the successor have the correlative right
to maintain that the incumbent union should abide by the terms
of the existing labor agreement? Would not the balancing contemplated in Wiley be more fully attained if this were true?

44

28,084.

Burns Int'l. Detective Agency, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 21,863, at

4-I d. at 28,085 (emphasis added). The court also noted that the signed
collective bargaining agreement had proven to be the overriding factor in the
stabilization of the industrial community. In short, negotiated labor agreements had served to place effective restraints on those forces which otherwise
would have generated industrial strife.
46 182 NLRB No. 52, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. I"
21,864.
47 182 NLRB No. 53, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 21,866.
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Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftmen's Assn.4 8
dealt with this issue. In 1961 Bath Iron Works Corporation purchased all of the outstanding stock in the Hyde Windlass Company.
Both were principally engaged in shipbuilding. Subsequent to the
purchase, Hyde existed as a wholly owned subsidiary of Bath. The
Bath Marine Draftsmen's Association had been chosen the exclusive
bargaining agent for some Bath employees and also for a portion
of the Hyde employees. The Association represented the respective
employees in two separate units and each unit had different contracts-the Bath contract conferring more benefits.
In 1964, while both contracts were in effect, Bath merged with
Hyde. Following the merger, Bath notified the Association that it
intended to abide by the collective bargaining agreement between
Hyde and the Association. The Association took the position that
the merger had nullified the Hyde agreement, and since the former
Hyde employees were now employed by Bath, they were automatically covered by the Bath Contract. Bath excepted to this and
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for clarification.
The Board reviewed the facts and said:
It is clear from the above that the changes in corporate
reorganization have not effected such changes in the
status of the employees as would require us to find that the
two units have been merged. Nor are we satisfied that, on
this record, we can say that only separate units are appropriate. For these reasons and because of the outstanding
contracts, we conclude that the issues raised here are not
properly to be resolved at this time in this type of proceeding.4 9

Thereafter, in the Maine Federal District Court the union sought
a declaratory judgment making the collective bargaining agreement
between Bath and the union applicable to the Hyde employees.
The court divided the issue into two parts: (1) whether, as
a matter of contract interpretation, the Bath contract could be
extended to the Hyde employees; and (2) whether, as a matter of
federal labor policy, the Hyde contract could survive the merger
and be exclusively controlling. Judge Gignoux ruled favorably for
the union on both counts. Initially, a vague succession clause in the
393 F.2d 407 (1st Cir. 1968).
Bath Iron Works Corp., 154 NLRB No. 85 at 1070, 1965 CCH NLRB
Dec. f 9676, at 16,374.
48

49
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Bath contract was held to apply "plainly" to the Hyde employees.
The directives of Wiley were scrutinized and found not to require
the survival of the Hyde contract under the unique facts presented.
Accordingly, the Bath contract was held binding.50 However, on
appeal the circuit court modified the lower court's holding. It ruled

"the Bath contract shall govern any arbitration but shall not, in the
absence of arbitration, constitute the controlling contract." 5' Retreating slightly from the district court's holding, the circuit court's
discussion emphasized several factors. Perhaps the relative differences in the size of the two companies were crucial.5 2
The Bath holding has been subjected to substantial criticism
from the legal community. Professor Stephen B. Goldberg argued
that the successor who merely takes over the business of his predecessor should be entitled to request and secure the same contract

rights against the predecessor's employees as did the predecessor.5"
Why, Professor Goldberg asked, should employees who were unsuccessful in utilizing the machinery of arbitration to obtain higher
wages and benefits under the predecessor's contract be free to accomplish indirectly, under the pretext of successorship, exactly
what they had been unable to achieve directly? Other writers,

though not citing Bath as the antithesis of their position, seemed to
align themselves substantially behind the theory that the same continuity of identity rationale underlying the successor's duty to
arbitrate should apply with equal force when asserted by a successor
50

Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 266 F.
Supp. 710 (S.C. Me. 1967).

51Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n., 393 F.2d
407, 5411 (1st Cir. 1968).
2 Note that the court said:
[A]fter a corporation in the situation before us has defined and
settled all questions of management authority and responsibility
through merger, it is not unfair to require that employee wages and
benefits also be subjected to a limited scrutiny to the end that
discrepancies in treatment attributable solely to limited bargaining
power stemming from more limited financial capacity on the part
of the smaller and now merged corporation may be rectified.
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsman's Ass'n., 393 F.2d 407, 411
(1st Cir. 1968) (emphasis added). The Court's statement that "[a] disparity
which could be tolerated when neighboring employers operated separate
entities in unlike circumstances might well be a source of dissatisfaction,
unrest, and even tests of strength, after merger" suggests that the factor of
the two companies occupying adjoining premises may have been determinative.
Id. (emphasis added). It seems reasonable to surmise that an employment
situation which fostered a disparity in benefits for comparable worker skills
would be unfavorable at best.
43 Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer,
63

Nw. U. L. Ruv. 735 (1969).
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seeking to hold the union to its past contractual obligations.5 4
Perhaps the most scatching attack was in a case comment in the
New York University Law Review. In that student commentor's
opinion the Bath approach was "incorrect". Generally, he believed
the decision disregarded the balancing of policies rooted in Wiley
and doing so introduced new uncertainty into the law. 5
In Walter Kidde & Co., Kota Division of Dura Corp.,"6 another companion case to Burns, the Board redefined an employer's
rights in the typical successorship context. The case involved an
unusual interlacing of facts. The successor had purchased all the
assets of the predecessor employer. Following the sale, all the
employees were assured that the plant would continue under the
same management, that salaries, wage rates, and fringe benefits of
workers would remain the same, and employees of the predecessor
would automatically become employees of the successor. In fact,
instead of disaffirming the contractual obligations of the previous
labor agreement, the successor expressly assumed them. However,
the union pointed out the present contract had no "successor or
assigns" clause, and contended that the new employer was required
to negotiate a new contract. The employer took the position that
the contract bound both the union and the employer. The union
filed unfair labor practice charges, but the Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of the complaint. The Board agreed and tersely
explained:
The Burns case involved the duty of a successor
employer to honor the contractual obligations of its predecessor with the representative of its employees, whereas
this case involves the converse side of the coin, i.e., the
right of the successor employer to insist upon the union's
adherence to the contract negotiated with the predecessor
employer. The legal policy considerations which impel
our conclusion that the continuing vitality of a bargaining
54

Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized
Business, 19 CCH IAB. L.J. 160 (1968); Note, The Successor Employer's
Duty to Arbitrate: A Reconsideration of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARv. L. REV. 418 (1968).
5 Comment, Labor Law-Contract Survival-Surviving Corporation May
not Hold Union To PredecessorEmployer's Contract, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 220
(1969). The balancing of policy alluded to of course entails the weighing
of the rightful prerogative of an owner to rearrange his business independently
against the right of the individual employee to be insulated from sudden
changes in the employment relationship.
56 182 NLRB No. 51, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 21,885.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss1/7

16

McKay: Labor Law--Successorship--the NLRB Has a Change of Heart
STUDENT NOTES

relationship and its contract obligations should be maintained in a successorship situation are, of course, the same
in eithercase."
CONCLUSION

There are some general observations that can be made after
examining developments during the relatively short period of time
from Wiley to Burns. Essentially, the Wiley rationale was predicated
on a balancing of interests test. Specifically, the Court attempted to
weigh a successor employer's legitimate interest in the unfettered
management of his commercial enterprise against an employee's
interest in being protected from capricious changes in the conditions
of his employment resulting from a transfer of corporate ownership.
These respective interests were weighed and it was determined that
the employee's interest needed reinforcement. Therefore, a successor
employer was required to arbitrate with the predecessor union.
However, the question of contract survival began to appear with
increasing frequency, taxing the Board's ability to evade the issue.
Finally, in Burns it was faced with no recourse but to resolve the
issue. 8 Hereafter employers in the corporate marketplace must be
especially cautious in evaluating a prospective acquisition. It is
probably wise to heed the sound advice that " 'in taking over a going
concern.., the labor title is to be searched as diligently as the title
to real property.' "I' But the Wiley decision should not be viewed
as a complete setback for enterprising business establishments-they
now appear to be endowed with the right to insist that a union adhere
to the existing collective bargaining agreement.
It would seem that Burns and its companion cases have forewarned the prospective buyer that particular rights and correlative
duties will attach upon acquisition. The buyer should generally
expect nothing less than a requirement to assume the exisisting labor
contract. On the other hand, the union should ordinarily expect
nothing more than a continuation of existing contract benefits.
CraigR. McKay
57
Walter Kidde & Co., Kota Division of Dura Corp., No. 91 BNA
Daily Labor Report D-5 (May 15, 1970).
51At the time of this writing, two successorship cases have been decided
which expressly follow the Burns holding. Ranch-Way, Inc., 183 NLRB No.
116, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,089; S-H Food Service, Inc., 183 NLRB
No. 124, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,093.
59 Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized
Business, 19 CCH LAB. L.J. 160 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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